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Abstract 
 
Are rules for the world generated by international organizations' 
bureaucracies or private authority? Certainly both. This paper questions the 
utility of a distinction between international bureaucracies and transnational 
private authority, and points to how actors responsible for governing the 
world economy move between public and private roles. To help understand 
this ‘revolving doors’ phenomenon we borrow from Andrew Abbott’s work 
on ‘linked ecologies’, in which actors within different professional ecologies 
form coalitions to create alliance strategies in which they can propagate the 
relevance of their ideas and skills. If successful, an alliance between ecologies 
can take control of a policy ‘location’ - how a policy problem should be 
legitimately understood. We examine the benefit of linked ecologies 
approaches through two case studies of alliances competing for the best way 
to solve international financial stability issues, drawing upon interviews with 
practitioners from key international organizations and policy networks.  
 
 
Keywords: bureaucracy; private authority; linked ecologies; financial reform; 
G30; Basel Committee; IMF; World Bank.  
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Introduction 
 
Are rules for the world generated by international organizations' 
bureaucracies or private authority? Certainly both. In this paper we explore 
the phenomenon of ‘revolving doors’, whereby actors move between the 
public and private spheres, and its impact on how policy problems, such as 
financial stability reforms, are addressed. This paper questions the utility of a 
distinction between international bureaucracies and transnational private 
authority, and points to how actors responsible for governing the world 
economy move between public and private roles. The notion that 
international organizations can be considered traditional bureaucracies is 
particularly problematic if one considers how actors commonly move 
between public and private spheres of activity. This is equally true for the 
notion of private authority as separate from the influence of public 
institutions. What is particularly important here is that to ascribe public or 
private identities to actors and then seek to link those identities to forms of 
authority that are understood as absolutes distorts how we understand the 
practice of how international standards and benchmarks are formed. 
Ascribing public or private labels provides a pre-social determination that 
inhibits us from identifying new practices that may actually be more 
important than assuming a logic of command or appropriateness. We suggest 
that a linked ecologies approach overcomes the inadequacies by focusing on 
how actors continually seek to use ideas, skills, and practices to create 
coalitions and alliances without ever retaining control of how the idea is 
interpreted by other actors. 
 
As we clarify below, the linked ecologies framework provides a different 
approach to the focus on pathologies, diffusion, emulation, and learning in 
international institutions. We suggest that this literature is particularly helpful 
in understanding how ideas are transferred and socialized, including the 
recent specification of a variety of cognitive, behavioral, and other causal 
mechanisms (Gehring and Oberthür, 2009). However, the insistence that 
institutions have a public or private identity frustrates and inhibits our 
capacity to see how actors compete over ideas and skills that cross over a pre-
determined public-private divide. As Jeffrey W. Legro (2009) has argued, 
identities have ‘plasticity’ and can be pushed and pulled by ideas in contests 
between individuals and groups.   
 
We know from interviews with staff from various institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS), the Group of 30 (G-30), the World Bank (WB) and others, 
that these bodies value technical skills commonly held by professionals in 
private markets. Indeed, in recent years those in control of regulation have 
actively sought to learn from actors in the private sector in order to better 
assess risks from financial innovations (Tsingou, 2004). The view that 
financial markets are complicated and technical has led to greater reliance on 
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knowledge transfer from professionals engaged in asset trading and 
evaluation to regulators who are more commonly aligned with the profession 
of designing fiscal and monetary systems policies. Furthermore, in the last 
decade there has been consensus among public and private sector actors on 
the need for transparency and market-based supervision, in part because the 
private sector and public sector are not as separate as one might think. 
Officials and practitioners often have common educational backgrounds and 
are engaged in networks that link different professions (Tsingou, 2004). Given 
that actors in public and private sectors interact, and that there is a great deal 
of traffic between the two as actors move through revolving doors, work on 
authority and delegation that sees policy as dictated by who is in command, 
or what the organizational culture dictates as appropriate, may miss policy 
operates as practice (e.g. Lipsky, 1980). 
 
As such, we find that while discussions of public and private authority in the 
world economy are informative, as there has been a general shift towards 
standards that provide professionals in private markets with more control, 
upon closer levels of magnification a logic command or appropriateness must 
be replaced by a logic of practice.1 Revolving doors provides a good example 
of such a practice.  
 
We suggest that the ‘revolving doors’ phenomenon is underappreciated and 
poorly understood within work on how international financial standards are 
created and how certain ways of addressing international policy problems, 
such as financial stability, are legitimized. To remedy this failing, we suggest 
that we should place less stress on the logic of command and more on the 
logic of practice. This choice is informed not only by the ‘practice turn’ in 
International Relations, but especially the work in sociology on professions 
(notably Abbott, 1988, 2005a and Fourcade, 2006). From the latter we borrow 
a conceptual apparatus to understand how actors within professional 
ecologies form coalitions that seek to influence practices within other 
ecologies by forming alliances with like-minded or sympathetic coalitions 
within them. Following Abbott (2005a) we discuss professional ‘ecologies’ 
and how actors seek to create ‘hinges’ and create linked ecologies in an 
attempt to gain control over a policy ‘location’. By gaining control of a policy 
location an alliance of actors (effectively an alliance of coalitions within the 
respective ecologies) is able to influence how certain policy problems are 
understood and inform broader norms on how policy problems should be 
legitimately addressed.  
 
The paper follows in four sections. In the first section we discuss the literature 
on private and public authority, as well as the literature on policy diffusion 
and pathologies within institutions. The key point is that literature that relies 
on a logic of command or appropriateness – that reads off power structures or 
organizational culture – to understand how actors operate in practice 
provides only part of the puzzle. We also draw upon work on bureaucracy 
4 
 
that seeks to specify how actors harbor private goals in addition to their 
public vocation and will actively seek to increase their prestige through their 
engagement with other ecologies. In the second section we flesh-out Abbott’s 
conception of linked ecologies.  
 
Sections three and four provide the case studies on revolving doors and 
linked ecologies, viewed through hinge strategies to capture the location for 
financial stability reform. We identify three professional ecologies: ‘Fiscal and 
Monetary Systems (FMS)’ (those concerned with public finance and monetary 
policy), ‘Asset Trading and Evaluation (ATE)’ (banks and investment firms, 
as well as risk management and credit rating), and ‘Professional Economic 
Sciences (PES)’ (those engaged in the professional development of economy 
theories). Actors from these ecologies seek to form coalitions within their own 
domain and strike up alliances with coalitions in other ecologies to control the 
relevant policy ‘location’ – for example, ‘what should we focus on to enhance 
financial stability to avert financial crises’. Actors within their ecologies will 
argue over how to best make sense of such problems, and entrepreneurial 
actors will seek to persuade others of the best ‘policy location’ - how the 
policy should be addressed (Blyth, 2007; Flockhart, 2006).  
 
We detail these dynamics through two case studies. The first provides a 
negative case of a failed ‘hinge’ strategy (explained below) employed by the 
IMF and the WB through their Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), 
which sought to provide a new policy location for enhancing financial 
stability. Here actors located primarily within the FSM ecology sought to 
secure influence by calling upon a capacity to measure financial stability, in 
part through the proclamation of technical expertise and links to economic 
thought (with links to PES), and also by calling upon actors with links to ATE 
professions and skills. As their practices were not sufficiently supported by 
PES and had a lukewarm reception in the ATE ecology, the IMF-WB program 
had a weak impact.  
 
The second example provides a positive case of how the G-30 and the Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), under the auspices of the Bank 
for International Settlements, formed a hinge strategy that effectively 
proclaimed that the best treatment of financial stability reform was through 
what we call Regulation as Risk Management (RRM). In this case coalitions 
within FSM sought to link to ATE, and then imported many of their ideas and 
skills (providing ATE ‘avatars’ within the FSM ecology). The presence of 
these ideas and skills was confirmed through the links between both ATE and 
PES (on risk management) and also between FSM and PES, including through 
the introduction of Value at Risk (VAR) modeling into the Basel II 
international banking accord. Alliances and the exchanges of ideas and skills 
across the three linked ecologies were able to wrest control of the policy 
location for financial stability reform by increasing the prominence of RRM as 
standard practice (recognized by the IMF and WB through the inclusion of 
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Basel Committee derived standards in their assessment program for testing 
financial stability).  
 
We conclude by reflecting on the phenomena of revolving doors and the 
importance of linked ecologies arguments for understanding the legitimacy of 
policy locations.   
 
 
I.  Public Authority, Private Authority, and Pathologies 
 
Our conceptual claim is that thinking about ‘linked ecologies’ is better for 
understanding how policy is related to logics of practice rather than 
perspectives that focus on logics of command or appropriateness. 
Furthermore, we argue that to read actors’ interests and behavior off of the 
hierarchy of power or from the organizational environment does not help us 
understand the phenomenon of revolving doors and how it affects the 
creation of international and transnational standards on financial stability 
reforms. Rather, to ascribe an identity to actors that is informed by a power 
relationship (master-slave, etc.) or organizational environment (dog-eat-dog 
or communal, etc) papers over how actors may actually behave in practice. In 
this sense, ascribing identities as interests provides a pre-social judgment of 
how actors operate in a social environment. It also tends to treat actors within 
an organizational culture as singing the same tune when actors within their 
broader professions may actively seek to form coalitions and alliances with 
others that, in principle, violate logics of command or appropriateness. 
Linked ecologies arguments allow us to see how a loose grouping can 
distinguish itself (by professional skills, for example) while also stressing that 
within the grouping there is a great deal of contestation between actors. This 
also permits the view that actors will seek to increase their own prestige and 
welfare within the group by forming strategies that link them to other groups, 
or by propagating their own groups’ ideas and skills within other groups. 
Rather than the identification of professional training and skills, the actors are 
not considered to be ‘public’ or ‘private’, pre-social interaction, in a manner 
that casts an assumption about how they should and will behave. 
Importantly, the actors within linked ecologies never control how their ideas 
and skills are received by others, since the recipient’s identity does not 
automatically inform their behavior.   
 
This approach to understanding how actors within international 
organizations or firms behave is a long way removed from the orthodox 
approaches within International Relations. We review them here briefly not 
only to suggest the power of the linked ecologies approach, but also to give 
them a reasonable hearing.  
 
First of all, while the work on the ‘rational design’ of international institutions 
(Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001) provides the most parsimonious 
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approach for comparative institutionalist analysis, it provides little room for 
actors within organizations to buck a logic of command. Furthermore, as it is 
suggested that international organizations are the product of rational design 
by the states (and their respective power endowments) that created them, 
there is a clear separation of public from private. The ultimate authority for 
this literature is presumably public authority. Similarly, the expansive 
rationalist ‘diffusion’ literature has discussed how international agreements 
and standards require aligned conceptions of self-interest from states and the 
conditions under which this is likely to take place (Simmons, Dobbins, and 
Garrett 2008; Weyland, 2007). It also places emphasis on specifying the 
domestic conditions that permit states to receive international policies or 
standards. Key dynamics behind diffusion are competition and coercion. 
Importantly, this relatively new scholarship also places stress on the 
importance of emulation and learning, in which states seek to be seen as 
legitimate by others through the adoption of a standard (cf. Finnemore, 1996), 
and by which states seek to improve their information about uncertainties, 
but are required to rethink their standard operating procedures to do so 
(Simmons, Dobbins and Garrett, 2008). Ultimately here, however, the 
conception of how policies and standards are created is one in which public 
authority is really in charge, and where actors follow a logic of command. 
 
This view has been challenged by research on delegation and trusteeship, 
especially work concerned with how trustees are called upon to legitimate 
decision-making based on their professional norms and reputation (Alter, 
2008). A more forceful critique of the work on public authority has come from 
the significant body of work on private authority. This literature emerged, in 
part, through a dissatisfaction with the work on international regimes and the 
state-centrism of much International Relations scholarship. Work on private 
authority sought to redress the stress on public authority by providing a host 
of cases in which the answer to the question: ‘who’s the boss?’ was clearly not 
the state (Hall and Bierstecker, 2002; Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, 1999). This 
literature was certainly onto broader trends within the world economy that 
had already been identified as the retreat of the state (Strange, 1996) and the 
rise of international standard setting and guidance for public policy that was 
actually in the hands of private interests. In demonstrating how private 
authority was becoming more and more prominent, an argument often 
accompanied by the view that the private and public spheres were 
increasingly blurred, the emphasis on private authority perhaps tipped too far. 
This has recently been addressed by Rawi Abdelal (2007) in his work on 
financial liberalization, in which he argues the last decades have not so much 
seen the rise of private authority but more the delegation of public authority 
to private actors. From this insight the question is really about what practices 
support and reinforce such a delegation. And does the practice differ 
significantly from the intentions of those delegating? The revolving doors 
phenomenon is critical to solving this problem. 
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Deviation from a logic of command (a delegated task, for example) is 
common within bureaucracies. Much constructivist work in the last decade 
within International Relations has focused upon how staff within 
international organizations do not necessarily follow a logic of command, but 
have autonomy from their masters through the creation of an organizational 
culture.  
 
Among this literature, the most important work has been that on ‘pathologies’ 
within international organizations by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore 
(1999, 2004).  Barnett and Finnemore, following classic works on bureaucracy 
(such as Weber’s work), are interested in how staff within international 
organizations can distort policy outcomes and set-in practices that become 
part of the organizational culture. For example, the IMF has been criticized for 
its ‘bureaucratic universalism’ during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, 
which led to the application of reform models that were inappropriate.  
 
Our key concern with this literature is that it relies too heavily on the power 
of a logic of appropriateness to guide how staff behave, as well as seeing 
actors within an organization as behaving in a way that is established by the 
organizational culture. Ole Jacob Sending (2002), for example, has argued that 
seeing the logic of appropriateness as a key explanatory factor effectively robs 
actors of their actorness, since it reads their interests and intentions from the 
organizational culture. 
 
A relevant reflection here for differentiating logics of command and 
appropriateness from a logic of practice is to consider how bureaucracy is 
treated within constructivist scholarship. Barnett and Finnemore explicitly 
base their constructivist model on how international organizations behave 
from Max Weber’s theories of bureaucracy, to highlight the ‘normative power 
of the rational-legal authority that bureaucracies embody and its implications 
for the ways bureaucracies produce and control social knowledge’ (Barnett 
and Finnemore, 1999: 700). Bureaucracies do not simply follow their masters 
but have their own normative content and organizational culture. 
Bureaucracies rely on their technical expertise and their rational-legal 
authority to claim legitimacy for their actions, most of which includes 
defining how policy problems should be treated. As Barnett and Finnemore 
state: 
 
The ability to classify objects, to shift their very definition and identity, is one 
of bureaucracy’s greatest sources of power. This power is frequently treated by 
the objects of that power as accomplished through caprice and without regard 
to their circumstances but is legitimated and justified by bureaucrats with 
reference to the rules and regulations of the bureaucracy. Consequences of this 
bureaucratic exercise of power may be identity defining, or even life 
threatening (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 710). 
 
8 
 
We agree with this statement. How bureaucracies choose to treat policy 
problems strongly informs the identities of actors within the bureaucracies, as 
well as how those outside the bureaucracy can see the realms of possibility for 
policy adjustment. In this regard the ‘pathologies’ literature, based on 
Weberian fears of an iron cage and ‘specialists without spirit’, is right on the 
money on issues in which the public sphere and private sphere are 
functionally separated. Where there is little crossover between public sector 
professionals, trained for public careers, and private sector professionals, 
trained for market competition, ‘pathologies’ are more likely to take hold. 
Indeed, we find this to be true in one of our case studies below.  
 
However, on policy issues in which there is a great deal of back and forth 
between the public spheres and private spheres in how a policy problem 
comes to be defined, the ‘pathologies’ approach starts to lose some traction. 
This is especially the case if we read actors’ interests and behavior off of their 
bureaucratic culture. Assuming that actors’ behavior will follow an ascribed 
identity prior to their social interaction distorts our capacity to see the practice 
of how policy problems are constructed. Bureaucrats from a ‘public’ 
international organization may not call upon the technical expertise and 
rational-legal authority of their organization in asserting control over how a 
policy problem should be considered. Rather, in some cases these bureaucrats 
may call upon skills associated with professions in the private sphere or in 
academia to justify how a policy should be examined. In addition, actors 
within bureaucracies may have privately defined goals that differ from the 
organization’s claims to rational-legal authority or its dominant 
organizational culture (Lipsky, 1980: 144-6). Actors that seek to move through 
‘revolving doors’ will prize a skill set that differs from the typical 
representative of an organizations culture (be it in the public sector or private 
sector), and will behave in abnormal ways. Individual deviation from an 
organizational culture may be considered ‘policy entrepreneurship’ if the 
effort is later successful, or sabotage if it is not (cf. Crouch, 2005). In most 
cases policy entrepreneurship/sabotage will be not the action of an individual 
actor but that of a coalition of actors from within the organization and, more 
likely, from an alliance across organizations that can lend the initiative 
legitimacy and force.  
 
We suggest that the linked ecologies approach enhances our capacity to see 
how coalitions can form within organizational cultures where the actors do 
not conform to an ascribed public or private identity. In this sense we provide 
another tack on developments from a new generation within constructivist 
literature that is concerned with specifying variation in how staff within 
organizations behave. For example, Catherine Weaver’s work on ‘hypocrisy 
traps’ in the WB details how ideas and practices are institutionalized through 
observation, including non-participant observation of meetings, ‘brown-bag’ 
discussions, and the learning of what she refers to as the local language, 
‘Bankese’ (Weaver, 2008: 14). The result is a finely detailed analysis of how 
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hypocrisy creates distortions but also keeps the organization running, with 
fine distinctions made about conflicts between staff from different 
professional backgrounds over how to best understand issues such as 
governance (Weaver, 2008: 112-13). André Broome and Leonard Seabrooke 
(2007) have suggested that a comparative analysis of how different 
international organizations’ analytic institutions ‘see’ provides insight on how 
research staff seek to separate and differentiate themselves through their 
creation of policy problems to be solved. In addition, Ole Jacob Sending and 
Iver Neumman (2006) have asserted how concepts such as ‘global 
governance’ replicate a public vs. private sphere dichotomy and assume a 
logic of command, while staff on the ground have to learn from policy as 
practice if programs, such as population control, are to be successful. Such 
literature ties into ‘governmentality’ perspectives interested in practice. 
 
Work directly applicable to linked ecologies thinking includes that by Bessma 
Momani and Jeffrey M. Chwieroth. Momani’s (2007) work details not only 
forms of organizational culture within the IMF but also the private goals of 
particular staff who view themselves as research academics rather than IMF 
bureaucrats. To apply our language to Momani’s case, actors from the FMS 
ecology seek to enhance their prestige by demonstrating that their ideas and 
skills have an impact in the PES ecology. Jeffrey Chwieroth’s (2007a, 2007b) 
detailed mapping of how certain actors carry ideas from educational 
institutions to international organizations and then into national governments 
provides another example of interaction between different professional 
ecologies. Chwieroth has traced, for example, how a Latin American scholar 
who is trained at Chicago as an economist commonly spends an early career 
period at the IMF, and then carries neoliberal ideas home as a ‘technopol’ 
(‘technopols’ have ‘hybrid status as technocrats and politicians’) within the 
Treasury (Chwieroth, 2007b: 449). To apply our language once more, the 
implication of Chwieroth’s work is that actors within PES replicate their ideas 
and skills within FMS, and links between PES and ATE affirm those practices 
within all three professional ecologies, providing a ‘policy location’ that 
becomes the most legitimate treatment of issues such as capital liberalization. 
Momani and Chwieroth do not discuss the revolving doors phenomenon and 
restrict their focus to actors who are identified in the public sphere.  
 
We seek to build upon this new thread of literature by examining revolving 
doors through the linked ecologies framework. In doing so we argue that 
rather than focus on a logic of command, or a logic of appropriateness, to read 
actors’ interests from hierarchies of power or organizational culture, a logic of 
practice is the best route to assessing why revolving doors is present, and 
why it matters for international standard-setting. Through this aim we link to 
current work in sociology of professions that stresses how professionalization 
is not socialization to a value system but also contestation over what practices 
should be privileged, and how best to persuade other professions to adopt 
those practices.  
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II. Forming Policy Locations through Linked Ecologies 
 
Our ‘linked ecologies’ approach is derived from Andrew Abbott’s work. 
Linked ecologies arguments provide a useful way of considering social 
interaction between actors from different professional backgrounds and with 
specialized skill sets, but where the identity of the actor (IMF staff, for 
example) does not determine their behavior. A few qualifications should be 
made about ecological thinking before we get into the thick of the discussion. 
In a similar manner to sealing off ‘public sphere’ from ‘private sphere’, earlier 
studies that applied ‘ecology’ as a metaphor or analogy were criticized for 
isolating and black-boxing a certain part of the social world from other 
elements, creating a distorted picture of both the sources of change within the 
ecology, as well as the importance of the ecology within the wider social 
system that provided no explanatory power (Wallerstein, 1976).  
 
Abbott’s (2005a: 246) response to such criticisms is to ‘reconceptualize the 
social world in terms of linked ecologies, each of which acts as a (flexible) 
surround for others’ and apply it to the development of professions. Within 
this conceptualization the ecologies are linked rather than isolated, with no 
external ‘independent’ realm operating as a referee or judge on standards or 
practices developed within the ecologies. Rather, the struggle within the 
linked ecologies over the selection of practices and ideas exists within an 
intersubjective shared understanding (cf. Hall, 2008: 5). As such, the most 
competitive and successful developments across ecologies draw upon actors 
in different ecologies and combine their ideas, skills and resources (across, for 
example, governments, firms, and third sector associations) within an alliance 
that fights against other alliances that represent different ideas, skills 
recognition, and resources (Abbott, 2005a: 247). Importantly, the element of 
combination across linked ecologies here has distinct advantages compared to 
the other concepts commonly employed in political economy, such as 
‘institutional complementarity’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001; cf. Crouch, 2005). This 
is the case since the latter seeks to isolate how organizations within a ‘sealed’ 
institutional environment or ecology, while linked ecologies provides room 
for the notion that skills, resources, and ideas may be spread via alliances 
transnationally or internationally, rather than within a national domain. 
Rather than finding complementary partners within an already-existing 
institutional framework or mindset, combination across linked ecologies 
opens up greater space for identifying how practices emerge across ecologies 
that would normally be treated as discrete categories. This should certainly 
assist us in identifying how transnational and international standard-setting 
processes are established. For Abbbott, ecology is  
 
best understood in terms of interactions between multiple elements that are 
neither fully constrained nor fully independent. We thus contrast ecology with 
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mechanism and organism on the one hand and with atomism and 
reductionism on the other (Abbott, 2005a: 248).  
 
Ecologies are social systems where the overall effect of interaction, rather than 
the capacities of any particular individual actor, is most important. 
Furthermore, rather than an organic whole or mechanistic switch, the ecology 
itself is a realm of contestation between the actors and their coalitions. As 
neither atomistic law-of-the-jungle competition nor self-propelling organic 
entity, ecologies are bundles of relationships that can only be differentiated by 
comparative analysis.  
 
Abbott outlines how an ecology typically contains ‘actors, locations, and a 
relation associating the one with the other’ (2005a: 248), which, for his own 
work, can be understood as professions, their controlled tasks, and how 
professions and task relate to each other. Coalitions within ecologies form 
alliances to fight over control of the locations – which may be seen as fights 
over a shared understanding of the most legitimate form of tackling a task or 
problem. Unlike Pierre Bourdieu’s work (1993) on ‘fields’, Abbott stresses 
competition between actors rather than the replication of structures of 
domination, as well as how actors are promiscuous in how they borrow and 
promote ideas rather than conforming to hierarchies of genres within an 
established field. Such an approach conforms to Kratochwil’s (2006: 23) 
endorsement of ‘practical knowledge’ over formalization. It also has close ties 
to the pragmatist thought in organizational sociology that stresses 
decentralized learning and continual reevaluation of benchmarks (Sabel, 
2005). Abbott’s work also differs from Bruno Latour’s work (2005) on Actor-
Network Theory in that Abbott’s concern is the formation and decomposition 
of coalitions and alliances within and among the ecologies (see also Abbott, 
2005b), while Latour and his followers concentrate on situating actors within 
a network and detailing how it is maintained. 
 
Abbott’s work on universities and states as professional ecologies provides a 
way of understanding how behavior changes across different ‘ecologies’ that 
is useful in locating how ‘revolving doors’ may be changing international 
financial governance. Abbott describes how ‘linked ecologies’ require the 
presence of ‘hinges’, understood as issues or strategies that can operate within 
different ecologies at the same time, as well as ‘avatars’, which replicate the 
ideas and skills of one profession into a new ecology. Through hinges and 
avatars a coalition in one ecology can seek to transform the ideas and 
practices about a particular task in another ecology. These ideas and skills are 
never secured within the linked ecology but provide grounds for contestation. 
 
The value-added of the conception of linked ecologies is to investigate how 
actors form coalitions and alliances to transform how things are done within 
areas not formally within their remit. It asks us to see ‘locations’ as 
intersubjective understandings about how a problem is constructed for a 
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particular task. For example, Abbott contends that within a political ecology 
the locations are not  
 
formal legislatures, administrative councils, electoral committees, and so 
on; these latter are better viewed as simple settings of competition. They 
are not locations at all in the ecological sense of being endogenously 
created positions in a competitive space. The real locations in the political 
ecology are the analogues of jurisdictions in the professional one; they are 
themselves constructed out of matters of political concern… Another way 
of putting this is to say that no political group is interested in dominating 
a legislature simply for the sake of dominating a legislature; what it really 
wants to dominate is some set of political issues, decisions, and outcomes 
(Abbott, 2005a: 252).  
 
Another application of linked ecologies arguments is useful as an illustration: 
Marion Fourcade and Rakesh Khurana have demonstrated how business 
schools in the US were transformed by economists who legitimated ‘Chicago-
style’ neoliberal economic policies as the most scientific and legitimate in an 
ecology that was founded to provide liberal arts undergraduates with moral 
leadership and administrative skills (Fourcade and Khurana, 2008: 6). As 
such, those who favored business curricula to stress quantitative methods 
based on neoclassical economics and ‘management science’ replaced the 
political economists who dominated earlier business schools, with their focus 
on regulatory problems and questions of moral authority. Alliances between 
research foundations, such as Ford, the scientization of management practice 
that was pushed by U.S. military research centers, and corporations as 
conglomerates that employed the ‘scientific’ methods were important in 
transforming business school ecologies (Fourcade and Khurana, 2008: 17). 
Once strategies (the ‘hinges’) for the creation and dissemination of knowledge 
were created from the ecology of economics professionals into the ecology of 
business school education, the increased legitimacy of ideas and skills 
associated with the economics profession (‘avatars’) transformed business 
schools. As theory and methods borrowed from economics were increasingly 
prominent and performed, they reinforced a new way of thinking about 
business that entrenched neoclassical economics as the legitimate standard. 
 
We suggest that the concept of linked ecologies is useful for understanding 
the formation of locations – tasks to be addressed and handled in a particular 
way – for financial stability reform within and across countries. We argue that 
this is especially the case due to the revolving doors phenomenon, whereby 
actors are rewarded for transferring their skills and knowledge (and their 
capacity to influence locations) between what is conventionally understood as 
the private sector and the public sector. Abbott’s stress on locations is that 
they are not identified as ‘a location by virtue of having a set of abstract 
properties that position it in some abstract social or cultural space in advance 
of social interaction’, but by the fact that actors have come to define how a 
task should be legitimately intersubjectively understood (Abbott, 2005a: 249). 
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Establishing control over a policy location boils down to what alliance can 
create the dominant understanding on how a policy problem should best, and 
most legitimately, be treated. 
 
This understanding of the endogeneity of ‘locations’ is important for 
understanding contemporary attempts at defining what is important for 
international financial reform because it does not impose external and 
abstract pre-social categories that would blind us to seeing how certain 
strategies (hinges) and the replication of certain ideas and skills (avatars, for 
Abbott) are formed. Thus, the ‘international’ and ‘national’ cannot be treated 
as discrete systems. Furthermore, and more important for this paper, we 
suggest that by focusing on how actors create alliances to develop hinges and 
avatars, the debate on 'private authority' versus 'public authority' becomes 
antiquated, since these pre-social categories are externally imposed and do 
not reflect the ‘revolving doors’ realities where different ecologies are linked 
by various alliances and their strategies. 
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As stated above, we identify three professional ecologies: ‘Fiscal and 
Monetary Systems (FMS)’, ‘Asset Trading and Evaluation (ATE)’, and 
‘Professional Economic Sciences (PES)’. The policy problem at hand is how 
best to treat financial stability reform and the fight is over who can control the 
policy location. Actors in all three ecologies will seek coalitions within their 
ecologies and through hinge strategies alliances with others to control the 
policy location.  
 
Figure 1 (above) provides a ternary interaction diagram of the professional 
ecologies and the overall outcomes in how policy locations relate to the 
different professions. Alliances from the three ecologies seek to control the 
policy location for financial stability reform – to win the contest of how 
financial stability reforms should most legitimately be treated (on domestic 
legitimacy contests see Seabrooke, 2006). We describe two cases below that 
discuss the policy location of financial stability reform prior to the 
international financial crisis of 2007-9. The position of the FSAP and RRM 
relative to the three ecologies, and the area they occupy, indicates the 
outcomes from the case discussed below. FSAP, the negative case, is a result 
of interaction between FMS and its links to PES, but has only a weak 
connection to ATE (despite pretenses otherwise, as discussed below). RRM, 
the positive case, is located in the middle, reflecting how alliances from all 
three ecologies came to propagate, or adapt to, ideals and skills tied to 
Regulation as Risk Management. The diagram does not provide a 
disaggregated depiction of the coalitions within the ecologies, and their 
varied hinge strategies, that fought for FSAP or RRM. We leave this to the 
case narratives, to which we now turn.2 
 
 
III. IMF-WB and the Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
 
The Financial Sector Assessment Program was introduced as a Joint IMF-WB 
initiative in May 1999. The underlying rationale for FSAP was to assist the 
Bretton Woods institutions in rescuing their bruised reputations following 
their inadequate and highly criticized performance during the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-8. A further rationale for the program was that the international 
organizations sought to compete for attention during a period in which other 
institutions and fora were emerging. The creation of the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) in late 1998 explicitly sought to tackle financial stability reforms 
within national governments, as well as assist in developing a new set of 
international standards.3 The FSF initiative clearly emerged from the FMS 
ecology, the same professional ecology in which the majority of staff within 
IMF and the WB operate. The FSF essentially pushed the IMF and the WB to 
demonstrate what they could bring to the table in assisting with financial 
stability reform. While the FSF concentrated on dialogue among various 
partners, the IMF-WB response through FSAP was to assert their intellectual 
skills on comparative policy knowledge (which provides a foundation for 
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much of its activity, see Pauly, 1997; Broome and Seabrooke, 2007; Broome, 
2008).  
 
As a strategy to gain control of the financial stability reform policy location, 
FSAP represented a hinge strategy from the IMF-WB coalition, to link the 
FSM to PES ecologies through the generation of indicators and measures on 
financial stability, while also linking to ATE through rhetoric that the 
information gathered from assessments would be valuable to markets (cf. 
Best, 2010). The original justification for FSAP was that it could promote 
country ownership of financial stability reform – that is to encourage 
governments to voluntarily adopt international standards rather than have 
them pressured by the IMF-WB. A further rationale for the program was that 
it would provide a ‘judicious blend’ of market and official incentives, in that 
countries would wish to be assessed in order to attract foreign capital, and 
that making themselves fit for assessment would lead them to conform more 
closely with IMF-WB on financial system design (Financial Stability Forum, 
2000: 2). In practical terms, the FSAP is an assessment of a country’s financial 
stability, its financial soundness and capacity to absorb stress and, in 
particular, its compliance with international standards. FSAPs generate 
country reports, including the Financial System Stability Assessments (FSSAs) 
for the IMF and Financial Sector Assessment for the WB.4 In theory, the 
country reports provide information on financial system stability and are an 
important resource not only for the FMS professional ecology but especially 
for the ATE ecology who seek information on financial systems in order to 
profit from opportunities while avoiding investment in countries with 
vulnerable systems that are more prone to financial crises. FSAP therefore 
seeks to link comparative policy knowledge from FMS and good science 
informed by PES with market incentives and opportunities from ATE. This 
was the overall aim for the program in the IMF-WB coalition’s attempt to 
control the policy location for financial stability reform.   
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An important element of the FSAP is the creation of a dialogue between FMS 
professionals within the IMF-WB coalition and those within national 
governments.  
 
Formally, FSAPs provide a detailed and confidential aide-mémoire with the 
government. Staff from national authorities who have been involved in a 
FSAP are commonly invited to participate as experts on other FSAP missions. 
In this way, the IMF-WB coalition actively creates coalitions to spread its 
ideas and practices within the FMS ecology. This point was stressed during 
field interviews, including the view that the pro-market justification for FSAP 
was primarily rhetorical and that enhancing the IMF’s comparative policy 
knowledge and the potential for bilateral confidential policy dialogue was the 
real aim.5 
 
FSAPs have not been successful in creating stable coalitions within the FMS 
due to the allocation of resources and staff to the program (see also IEG, 2006: 
12-13). FSAPs are typically staffed by an equal number of members from the 
IMF and the WB.6 with mission experts brought in from national agencies and 
from other organizations, especially the committees housed by the Bank for 
International Settlements.7 Experts on FSAP are typically short-term IMF or 
WB employees who are under tight time constraints to complete reports and 
who seek to avoid any contentious issues since this requires draft 
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commentary and rebuttal with the government authority within a period of 
six weeks.8 A lack of memory among the staff due to high turnover, a 
phenomenon also related to revolving doors to the extent that the IMF-WB 
can attract actors from ATE to participate in their program, is not helped by 
an incapacity to deal with contentious politics. Indeed, FSAPs have been 
criticized for not providing sufficient information on financial system stability 
with regard to international capital because this information is too politically 
sensitive and would lead to comment on a country’s reputation.9 This 
problem reflects the difficulty in FSAP dealing with national governments 
while assessing international standards, leading to possible international 
shaming and a loss of reputation (Sharman, 2008).  
 
The FSAPs also seek to provide intellectual innovations through 
improvements in the measurement of financial stability and risk. In this way 
the link between ecologies is stronger between FMS and PES, with the link to 
ATE more rhetorical than substantive. Such links between FMS and PES can 
be understood within the IMF where, as stated in an interview, the staff are 
bred to be ‘mini versions of Keynes’, concerned with policy but also linked 
into professional economic sciences, with rewards going to those who can 
combine the two successfully.10 (For a contrast within the coalition, WB staff 
are rewarded for program approvals and completions more than their 
intellectual work).11 Further rewards would also go to those who could devise 
ideas that would change practices within not only the FMS ecology but also 
PES and ATE. At the beginning of the FSAP a great amount of intellectual 
energy went towards the creation of stress testing models (see, for example, 
Blascke et al. 2001) in which ‘the stress test was envisioned as a macro version 
of a bank value at risk model’  (Kupiec, 2005: 77). While stress testing became 
the most popular part of FSAP for national authorities (IEG, 2006: 16), a 
particularly important innovation was the development of Financial 
Soundness Indicators (FSIs) that sought to improve comparative 
measurement of financial stability. The official aim for FSIs was that they 
should assist both the IMF-WB through the development of a common policy 
platform, as well as ATE through improved and transparent information. 
 
The stress placed on comparable quantitative indicators is of particular 
interest given that early opinion on the FSAP positively stressed how 
‘narrative evaluation’ through a qualitative assessment of how a country 
conformed with international standards allowed for ‘a more nuanced 
assessment that can highlight progress or backsliding as well as describe the 
economy’s commitment to achieve further improvement’ (Financial Stability 
Forum, 2000: 24). Such a view may have worked within the FMS ecology, but 
not with PES or ATE where the quantification and indexing of assessments 
and evaluations has steadily increased (consider, for example, the rise of 
quantitative techniques in economics, or increased prominence of credit 
rating agencies through their indexing for comparative measurement of 
investment opportunities). The drive for FSIs as a new practice within the 
18 
 
IMF-WB can be seen as a hinge strategy to demonstrate that the IMF-WB was 
adapting to good science and in fact contributing to it in a way that could also 
better inform the market. FSIs could therefore potentially act as an avatar 
within PES, to a larger extent, and ATE, to a lesser extent. The foundation for 
FSIs, however, was weak due to data limitations. As a consequence, the 
 
Compilation of FSIs is, in practice, an ad hoc exercise – ‘There is little or no 
research, either within the IMF-WB or externally, that truly outlines a scientific 
methodology for linking FSAP FSIs analysis to reliable assessments of the 
health of the financial sector. The quality of an FSSA stability assessment 
depends largely on the quality of economic intuitions and instincts of the FSSA 
mission team (Kupiec, 2005: 75).   
 
Given this, how do FSAPs provide reliable market signals? This was one of 
the key justifications for the program. The answer is that FSAPs provide 
market signals only in cases in which the information on the market available 
from the ATE ecology, or from different coalitions within FMS, is extremely 
poor. The IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office noted in its assessment of the 
FSAP that ‘Credit rating agencies appear to use FSSAs somewhat more than 
market participants’ (IEO, 2006: 5). Country governments being assessed 
would understandably be concerned about how credit rating agencies asses 
the FSSAs, since if the market itself is uninterested, the agencies are then left 
to ‘act as interpreters, advocates, and enforcers’ of who has the appropriate 
financial system and who is creditworthy (Sinclair, 2005: 20).  
 
They may be especially concerned if they knew that there was a bias among 
FSAP staff to not follow evaluation practices often found in ATE or within 
PES,12 but to provide a semblance of rigorous quantifiable evaluations while 
also playing to privately defined goals of career ambition. From field 
interviews it was clear that junior staff who had engaged in revolving doors, 
and who possessed skills associated with ATE and were invited to use those 
skills within the WB, were valued for their knowledge but were blocked from 
replicating ATE ideas and skills within the IMF-WB coalition. Indeed, from 
these junior revolving doors it was commented that a key concern was that 
while their skills were ‘an advantage for the work, it is not an advantage for 
the career’.13 It was also considered that spending too much time in the FMS 
ecology would lead to isolation from the ATE ecology. Within the IMF the 
need to be ‘mini versions of Keynes’ distorts FSAP assessments and especially 
FSSA assessments that may be picked up by credit rating agencies. Kupiec 
found that there was a strong incentive within the IMF not to praise an 
economic boom but to identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses within 
countries to the extent that assessments were often overly negative (2005: 78). 
While senior staff on FSAPs in both the IMF and the WB suggested that their 
institutions needed ideas and skills from ATE, and would certainly encourage 
revolving doors, junior staff in the IMF rejected the importance of ATE ideas 
and skills, while WB junior staff who had moved through revolving doors 
regretted their choice.  
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FSAPs have declined in popularity and faced harsh assessment from the 
IMF’s and the WB’s independent evaluators (IEG, 2006; IEO, 2006). The 
decline of FSAPs, like the decline of ROSCs, can be attributed to their lack of 
popularity among national governments, especially if they are considered to 
provide negative market information (see Mosley, 2008). The countries being 
assessed in the past may have felt significant uncertainty about the quality of 
the assessment program, while others benefited from the close bilateral policy 
dialogue. As a consequence, IMF management encountered a trend whereby 
countries agreeing to FSAP requested that IMF staff sent on a FSAP mission 
should have spent only a short amount of time at the organization, since such 
staff would be more likely attuned to ideas and skills found in the ATE 
ecology.14  
 
FSAP’s key standards for financial stability reform are all externally derived 
from other organizations and institutions that have closer links between the 
FMS and ATE ecologies.15 As such, the IMF-WB was left in the position with 
FSAP of having created a program that provided assessments seen as not 
scientifically valid, hastily prepared, often overly negative, and which 
imposed standards over which the coalition had no formal control. Staff from 
FSAP missions reported that standards such as Basel II (see below) lent their 
activities legitimacy.16 Given the institutions’ broader legitimacy problems 
following the Asian financial crisis, it is no surprise then that IMF-WB’s 
capacity to control the policy location for financial stability reform was weak.  
 
 
IV. Basel Committee and the G-30 
 
The second case study documents how risk management has changed the 
nature of financial regulation and supervision and how it served to develop a 
policy location for understanding, promoting and safeguarding a notion of 
financial stability. In this case too actors within the FMS ecology have been 
presiding over a shift but have been doing so on the basis of much stronger 
and longer-term links with actors in ATE and PES. Over time, alliances on a 
common logic of what constitutes risk and what are appropriate standards in 
the regulation of financial markets emerged within FMS and ATE, with 
strong and ongoing legitimizing support from PES. The practice of revolving 
doors has enabled the ‘hinges’ necessary for this location to take shape.   
 
How the location materialized is best exemplified in the case of the BCBS 
standards on banking supervision, known as Basel II, where a policy location 
on what the appropriate rules for governing the activities of financial 
institutions and the appropriate mechanisms for generating these rules have 
been defined.17 Basel II, the principal regulatory and supervisory standards 
for financial institutions was developed on the basis of a three-pillar 
framework and with the understanding that banking rules must reflect the 
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activities, needs and sophistication of financial institutions. Pillar 1 on 
minimum capital requirements formally provides banks, with the approval of 
their supervisors, with the opportunity to self-assess their capital cushion 
needs on the basis of the complexity of their activities and the status of their 
internal risk management systems. In this context, large global financial 
conglomerates are subject to market-based regulatory arrangements which 
institutionalize risk management private sector practices, including on 
categorization of risks into market, credit, operational, etc and in the use of 
risk assessment models such as VaR.18 Pillar 2 focuses on the supervisory 
review process, with supervisors evaluating banks’ risk management 
techniques and internal procedures and instituting regular dialogue and 
interaction between private institutions and the public agencies. Importantly, 
Pillar 2 provides a structure that formalizes market-based supervision and 
encourages bank-by-bank risk analysis instead of broad supervisory 
principles and direction. Finally, Pillar 3 proposes disclosure requirements 
and recommendations for strengthening market discipline by focusing on 
transparency and allowing market participants to have access to information 
on risk management and measurement, and hence on the capital adequacy of 
an institution (BCBS, 2004).19 The end result can be said to be Regulation as 
Risk Management (RRM). 
 
In the development of Basel II, banking regulators and supervisors (FMS) 
appear to have pursued three key goals. In the first place, the capital 
requirements framework reflects private sector institutions’ (ATE) risk 
management systems for identifying and measuring exposure to risk, 
acknowledging that different firms require different treatment. Secondly, 
Basel II set up a framework for active supervision of banks’ internal practices 
(promoting close cooperation between FMS and ATE). Thirdly, it encouraged 
the efficacy of market discipline (as understood by ATE and promoted by 
PES), by providing guidelines for improved disclosure and transparency.  
 
Basel II was partly the product of an extensive consultation process, indicative 
of the importance of consensus in this policy field and the key role of all three 
ecologies in terms of input and guidance (see also King and Sinclair, 2003). 
Significantly, the proposals first took shape in the late 1990s through a report 
by the Group of Thirty (G-30, 1997), a private organization that brings 
together thirty senior practitioners with skills across the FMS, ATE and PES 
ecologies in a part-think tank, part-interest group and part-club setting.20 
 
In this environment, the policy principles adhered to in all three ecologies 
have become remarkably similar and the skills predominantly valued are 
those of ATE, with strong intellectual support provided by PES.21 Working 
contexts such as the G-30 have helped foster this situation of broad agreement 
and understanding but importantly, revolving doors, a well-established 
practice among both junior and senior staff in all three ecologies in this policy 
field, makes it possible for ‘hinges’ and specific strategies to take hold, an 
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provides ‘avatars’ that replicate skills and ideas developed in one ecology to 
take hold and define a task in another ecology. At the junior level, revolving 
doors can be explained in terms of considerations of remuneration versus job 
security but more broadly, at a more senior level, movement between the 
ecologies is often about prestige, influence and ‘wise men’ legitimacy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking closely at the formation of the RRM strategy and eventual policy 
location, we can see that the diffusion of skills, the importance of keeping up 
with the practice and theory of financial innovation and the promotion of 
understanding of what is appropriate financial governance are so ingrained 
that the practice of revolving doors goes largely un-noticed. In the words of 
one official: ‘It is the relationships that are important, not people’s 
positions’.22 In our analysis, therefore, individual motivations for moving 
between the ecologies are not at the forefront as the ‘hinges’ change how 
problems are defined – the ‘identity’ of the individual continues to be 
important with respect to their job description but ceases to matter when it 
comes to how he or she understands the issues and seeks to form policy 
alliances.  
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Importantly, the policy location also transcends the national/international 
divide – actors operating within these ecologies forge transnational ties, 
whereby links with counterparts abroad are both strong and relevant: large 
financial conglomerates share common goals with other (foreign) institutions 
of similar size and sophistication more so than they do with the rest of their 
(national) financial sector; similarly, regulators and supervisors are often 
closer to other members of the central banking community than they are to 
public bodies in their national context. Indeed, a strong impetus within FMS 
to ensure long-term independence from government interference has enabled 
and intensified the alliance between different ecologies. In practice, this has 
also meant that coalitions within ecologies have formed among the most 
‘international’ actors. This has been the case within the FMS ecology, where 
the preferences of the Federal Reserve in the case of the United States 
prevailed in the adoption of Basel II over those of other regulatory and 
supervisory agencies; similarly, regulators and supervisors in Europe chose to 
set aside concerns about the desirability of the standards for the majority of 
European financial institutions. Within ATE, the ‘internationals’ also 
prevailed in the forging of the RRM strategy; Basel II clearly represents the 
preferences and interests of the largest global financial institutions as these 
were consistently articulated through the Institute of International Finance, 
the main international banking lobbying group. At the same time, members of 
the PES ecology were actively engaged in this process, primarily through 
legitimization of the principles of self-regulation and self-supervision among 
a well-defined academic community, international but mostly based and/or 
trained in the United States.  
 
It is the case that ATE ideas and skills (‘avatars’) have been most prominent in 
the policy location, supported by PES. These have provided technical 
knowledge and formed the basis of a common understanding of financial 
stability reform. Actors in different ecologies, regardless of their formal 
functions, eventually came to operate with the same tools and information, 
rendering the distinction redundant. ‘One does adhere to the mandate and 
mission of one’s institution but one’s thinking on the financial framework and 
the skills required changes very little’.23  
 
But the strategy was also formed in a quest for authority and prestige and 
ultimately, a widespread belief (and ultimately trust) in the knowledge and 
legitimacy of those who ‘make money’, ‘look glamorous’ and command 
respect. The practice of revolving doors enables this at first and can reinforce 
it further: when regulators are aware that they are likely to become the 
regulated, for example, they might be more receptive to a particular type of 
market-friendly regulatory standard – in practical terms, an actor operating 
within the FMS ecology is unlikely to promote rules that would prove 
problematic when one goes through the revolving door into ATE. Similarly, 
the prestige of ATE has been a lure for members of the PES ecology, who may 
act as consultants or officials of financial institutions.     
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It is our view that we would be missing part of the story if we looked at the 
predominance of ATE skills and principles in terms of capture alone, 
however: few would have missed the high-profile revolving doors trajectory 
of former US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, for example and in these 
conditions, it is indeed arguably easier for an ecology (ATE) to gain ground, 
promote strategies and even gain authority.24 But the main point is not to 
affirm whether the authority is ultimately public or private (or indeed, 
whether its origins are in academia) but rather, to understand practices. This 
extent of the acceptance of revolving doors allows us to understand how solid 
the location has become (and how durable the coalitions and alliances that 
sustain it remain) – the dominant discourse on how policies on financial 
stability reforms are to be debated and problems solved has taken hold and is 
showing great resilience, even in a time of crisis.25 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper demonstrates the power of linked ecologies arguments through an 
examination of how ‘revolving doors’ informs financial stability reforms. We 
have provided a conceptual basis for understanding linked ecologies and 
contrasted it with established approaches. We located three professional 
ecologies that compete within and between themselves to capture the location 
of financial stability reform: Fiscal and Monetary Systems (FMS); Asset 
Trading and Evaluation (ATE); and Profession Economic Sciences (PES).  
 
We found that the IMF-WB coalition from the FMS ecology called upon ties 
with PES and marketability to ATE to justify its use of FSAP. In practice this 
was unrealistic and primarily there to justify policy dialogue rather than to 
quantify financial soundness or financial stability. For the IMF-WB, the 
justification for FSAP relied too heavily on calling upon actors who have 
experience between PES and ATE. We also found that the IMF-WB’s capacity 
to legitimately include PES was limited due to their organizational structures, 
which then means that ATE actors (and also home governments being 
assessed) find FSAPs less useful. This is especially the case because for the 
IMF to maintain links to PES, the incentive structure inside the organization 
was to provide sober and negative feedback (Kupiec, 2005: 78). Other than a 
few actors with unique skills to make links to PES and ATE (mainly senior 
management), the IMF-WB line on revolving doors was mainly cosmetic. 
Importantly, the IMF-WB FSAP program also sought to maintain financial 
stability reform within a national and bilateral framework. Discussion of 
international capital markets was discouraged in the assessments because it 
was too time consuming and contentious. As such, claims of best practice 
could not be supported from the alliance itself, since it relied on the standards 
and benchmarks produced by a more successful alliance found in the second 
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case. It is important to note that the IMF-WB case, a negative case study, 
supports the finding of the pathologies literature within International 
Relations. The logic of practice ultimately reinforced the logic of command 
from power structures and the organizational environment. In the first, 
negative case our linked ecologies approach provides means to cross-test the 
presence of pathologies within international organizations.   
 
In the second, positive, case the G30 and the Basel Committee effectively 
linked expertise from FMS and ATE (where the revolving doors phenomenon 
does work) and then justified it through PES. As PES also moves through 
revolving doors, it was able to export its ideas and skills to the FMS and ATE 
ecologies.  As such G30-BCBS coalitions in the three ecologies were able to 
capture the policy location on financial stability reform, in part because they 
effectively transnatonalized policy through best practice standards. This 
justification took a particular form, including the rise of risk management and 
the introduction of VAR models, etc., into transnational standards that 
emerged from ties between ATE and PES and were accepted as legitimate by 
FMS. The Regulation as Risk Management policy location was a key 
component behind the systemic failures that led to the international financial 
crisis of 2007-9 (Tsingou, 2009), and persists in the definition of the 
parameters for reform. 
 
Both cases investigated demonstrate how a logic of practice rather than a logic 
of command or appropriateness is at play. The pre-social identity of the actors 
within the ecologies (IMF official, for example) is less important than how the 
ideas and skills they employ, since relying on an assumed identity or 
organizational culture perspectives dissuades us from seeing why actors 
engage in revolving doors in the first instance, and why they seek to frame 
their behavior in that manner. Rather than being concerned with questions of 
authority or organizational culture, both of which are commonly assumed to 
command actors’ interests and behavior, we suggest that specifying how 
actors located in different professional ecologies seek to battle it out over how 
a policy problem should be ‘located’ is more important. Such battles can be 
found within ecologies as actors form coalitions in an attempt to strengthen 
the prominence of their ideas and skills. They also occur between ecologies as 
actors form alliances in which they seek to change practices within other 
ecologies and form a broader consensus that can capture a policy location. 
Finally, linked ecologies arguments ask us to relax our assumptions about 
actors’ identities and interests. More broadly, questions of whether authority 
is public or private in the creation of international standards transform into 
questions about how actors seek to link ideas and skills across ecologies to 
control a policy location as the best practice. Thinking about linked ecologies 
helps develop some important conceptual tools in revealing new information 
about how standards and policies are created, and helps us understand why 
and how revolving doors matter for the regulation of the world economy.  
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Notes 
 
1   A logic of command conveys a better notion of what authority must be respected lest 
the actor be punished. A logic of practice is not to be confused with a ‘logic of 
practicality’ (Pouliot, 2008), which seeks to understand background habits that 
inform decision-making environments.  
2 The case studies are based on a series of interviews with staff and officials at the 
relevant institutions. Specifically, Leonard Seabrooke conducted interviews in 
September-October 2008 with junior and senior staff at the IMF and WB working on 
the Financial Sector Assessment Program (including staff recruited from the private 
sector). Phone interviews were also conducted from April-June 2009 by Swati 
Chaudhary. On the second case Eleni Tsingou conducted interviews with public 
agency officials (junior and senior staff in US and UK regulatory and supervisory 
authorities), private sector directors and industry association representatives 
(especially linked to the Institute of International Finance) related to the work of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the G-30 in March, September and 
November 2008, as well as May 2009. 
3 The FSF became the Financial Stability Board in April 2009 and is set to become the 
key ‘soft law’ regulatory body within the post-crisis international financial 
architecture. 
4 The Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) are a by-product of the 
FSAP process and have received attention elsewhere (Mosley, 2008). 
5 Senior Official at the IMF, October 2008; Senior Official at the World Bank, October, 
2008; Phone interview with Senior Official at the IMF, June 2009. 
6 While noting that the WB does not participate in assessments of advanced 
industrialized countries. 
7 Senior official at the IMF, October 2008; Former FSAP team leader, October 2008. 
8 Senior official at the IMF, October, 2008; phone interview with Senior IMF official, 
June 2009 
9 Phone interview with Senior IMF official, May 2009. 
10 Senior official at the IMF, October 2008. 
11 Junior official at the WB, October 2008. 
12 As we know now, the practices of asset evaluation and creditworthiness assessment 
in the ATE ecology have been seriously questioned since the credit crisis of 2007-9. 
13 Junior official at the World Bank, 2008. 
14 Senior official from the IMF, October 2008.  
15 The banking supervision standards are derived from the Basel Committee, securities 
standards are drawn from the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), insurance standards are from the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), payments systems standards are taken from the Committee on 
Payments and Settlements Systems (CPSS) hosted by the BIS, and anti-money 
laundering and anti-terrorist financing standards come from the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) that is affiliated with the Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) (IEO, 2006: 90). 
16 Junior staff at the WB, October 2008. 
17 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) comprises key supervisors of 
the G-10 countries (actually 12): Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
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Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.  
18 See Power (2005) for an account on the introduction of operational risk and the 
underlying shift in the role of risk management in banking regulation and 
supervision. 
19 For an overview of the Basel process and a discussion of some of the politics leading 
to the revised standards, see Wood (2005). 
20 For an analysis of the role of the G-30 in the run-up to Basel II, see Tsingou, 2009. 
Comprehensive information on the group and its membership can be found at 
www.g30.org. 
21 In understanding the process of the shift for the FMS, the literature on scientization is 
particularly useful – see Marcussen (2007). 
22 Senior official at the Federal Reserve Board, March 2008. 
23 Former senior official at the European Central Bank and G-30 member, November 
2008. 
24 See, in particular, Johnson (2009) who focuses on the ‘flow of individuals between 
Wall Street and Washington’, emphasizing the influence of Goldman Sachs and its 
alumni in US financial policy- making. 
25 And this, despite some skills associated with ATE being seen as redundant or even 
detrimental in crisis management (observation of a former senior official of the 
Financial Services Authority, UK, June 2009). 
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